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Abstract 
This paper focuses on retirement behaviour in Poland, especially early withdrawal from the 
labour market. It shows that retirement ages are very low, which can be attributed to the current 
regulations of the old-age pension system, as well as other pre-retirement transfers. The age of 
retirement is closely related to the legal framework of the pension system and changes that can 
be observed follow changes in legal regulations. The logit model constructed to measure the 
impact of selected individual characteristics on retirement shows that gender and education level 
have the greatest influence on retirement age. Women and persons with lower educational 
attainment usually retire earlier. Also, employees in the industrial sector tend to retire at a 
younger age. Higher wage levels before retirement provide incentives to work longer. 
Changes introduced in the new pension system, particularly the launch of the pension formula 
that links the old-age pension level to the contributions paid and life expectancy at retirement 
age, alters the incentives for future pensioners. Postponing retirement leads to significantly 
higher pension levels. As a result, it is expected that after 2008, the retirement age in Poland 
will rise sharply. Still, incentives will only work if society is provided with information about 
the pension system.  
 
                                            
* Agnieszka Chlon-Dominczak is the Deputy Minister of Labour and Social Policy in Poland. Until 
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and the Potential Impact 
of Pension System Changes 
ENEPRI Research Report No. 61/January 2009 
Agnieszka Chlon-Dominczak 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the flow of workers into old-age pensions in Poland in recent 
years and the factors that influence retirement decisions. It also provides an assessment of 
reforms introduced to the pension system in 1999 and their potential impact with regard to 
changes in retirement behaviour.  
The labour market participation of persons aged 50 and older in Poland is one of the lowest in 
the EU. Among the reasons underlying this situation is first, the early retirement privileges that 
were granted in the course of the 1970s and 1980s in response to worker’s protests. Second is 
the policy that was implemented to absorb the labour market mismatch after the economic 
transition with further early retirement privileges and relatively easy access to disability 
benefits. Third is the pressure that arose to maintain early retirement opportunities in the second 
half of the 1990s in order to assist the restructuring process, which mounted again at the time of 
rapidly rising unemployment and worsening labour market conditions.  
As a result of these policies, the number of pension beneficiaries grew dramatically, leading to a 
rise in total pension expenditures. This in turn led to increases in social security contribution 
rates and the tax wedge. In 2006, with a tax wedge of 43.7% of the total wage cost, Poland 
ranked among those countries above the OECD average (see OECD, 2007). The weight of 
social security contributions in the tax wedge is also high. Out of the 43.7% total, 21.4% is for 
employee social security contributions, 17.0% is for employer social security contributions and 
the remaining 5.3% goes to personal income tax. The high tax wedge itself has an impact on the 
labour market, especially in the case of workers with lower qualifications.  
By the same token, the employment rate of older workers has been gradually yet steadily falling 
over the past two decades. This experience has been contradictory to developments in the EU 
labour market, as the implementation of the Lisbon strategy has led to the introduction of 
policies aimed at improving the labour market participation of older workers.  
Figures 1-6 show the changes in the employment rates of older workers in Poland in comparison 
with the average level of the EU-25 countries. As one can see, since the end of the 1990s the 
gap between the employment of older workers in Poland and the EU countries has been 
widening. While in 1997, there was little difference between the EU-25 countries and Poland, 
the gap has since expanded to more than 15 percentage points and the distance to the Lisbon 
target (of 50%) is almost 22 percentage points. While the employment rate of men aged 55-64 
saw a recovery in 2005 and 2006, women’s employment has continued to decline. 
A slightly different picture emerges when we analyse the average exit age from the labour force. 
The gap in the exit age between Poland and the EU-25 has narrowed recently. In the case of 
men, we can see that the exit age in Poland is above that of the EU-25 countries. Yet, there is 
still a significant gap observed in the case of women.  
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Figure 1. Employment rate of workers aged  
55-64, total (%) 
Figure 2. Average exit age from the labour 
market, total  
   
Figure 3. Employment rate of workers aged  
55-64, men (%) 
Figure 4. Average exit age from the labour 
market, men 
   
Figure 5. Employment rate of workers aged  
55-64, women (%) 
Figure 6. Average exit age from the labour 
market, women 
 
Notes: The employment rate for the EU-25 in 2005 and 2006 is provisional; the average exit ages for the 
EU-25 in 2005 and 2006 are estimates. 
Source: Eurostat, 14 November 2007 (retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page 
?_pageid=1996,45323734&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=welcomeref&open=/&product=ST
RIND_EMPLOI&depth=2). 
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Thus, Poland faces a big challenge with respect to improving the labour market participation of 
older workers. Towards that end, its labour market policy lags behind developments in the EU. 
The situation is more acute in the case of women, whose labour market participation is 
particularly low, as is their exit age from the labour market.  
The pension reform of 1999 aimed at reducing early retirement and creating incentives to 
prolong working lives. It seeks to do so mainly through the pension formula, which takes into 
account the contributions paid throughout the entire working life and life expectancy at 
retirement age. As a result, the expected increase in an individual’s pension level can reach up 
to 10% of the benefit per each additional year of work and postponement of retirement.   
Still, the new pension system only covers persons born in 1949 and later. Additionally, there is 
also a transition rule that persons who have qualified for all retirement rights before the end of 
2008 can also retire under the old system.
1 This means that the expected effect will not be 
apparent until those covered by the new pension system reach retirement age, which will happen 
in 2009.  
The first section of this paper describes the existing early retirement options in Poland and 
resulting retirement age. The second section analyses the impact of individual characteristics, 
such as age, gender, education and industry in which a person worked at the point of his/her 
retirement. It also presents an analysis of retirement age in relation to the previous wage level. 
The third section discusses the potential impact of changes in the pension system on future 
retirement behaviour. This is followed by conclusions and recommendations on future policy 
directions.  
1.  Early retirement options in Poland  
Polish pension expenditure is still one of the highest of EU countries. Among other things, this 
is a result of the policies introduced at the beginning of the 1990s. In 1991, the number of new 
old-age and disability pensions granted under the employees’ pension system
2 peaked at 
815,000 persons. By comparison, in 2006 the number of new old-age and disability pensions 
granted was 80% lower (154,000). After 1991, the number of new pensions decreased, after 
absorbing the wave of early retirement pensions due to restructuring, which is shown in Figure 
7. The reduction in the inflow of new pensions between 1993 and 2000 may partially stem from 
the earlier retirement of persons who could have potentially retired in these years. After 2001, 
we observe a stabilisation in the numbers of newly granted pensions. 
In 1998, the option of early retirement after being laid off by a company was discontinued. New 
kinds of pre-retirement benefits were introduced, however. The pre-retirement benefits and 
allowances, financed by the labour fund, were paid to laid-off workers, initially from age 50 (in 
the case of women) or 55 (in the case of men), or in specific circumstances even below that age. 
After the restructuring process slowed down, the eligibility criteria for pre-retirement benefits 
were tightened. Currently, the pre-retirement allowances are paid to laid-off workers who 
cannot find employment and who are older than 55 (women) or 60 (men).  
 
                                            
1 Initially the transition period was planned to last until the end of 2006, but owing to changes in the law 
proposed by Parliament, this period was extended by two years (the changes were legislated before the 
parliamentary elections in 2005 and in 2007). 
2 This paper focuses on the employees’ pension system in Poland, which covers all workers and the self-
employed. It does not cover the separate pension systems for farmers or military forces. 4 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
Figure 7. Number of newly granted pensions (old-age and disability) in the employees’ pension 
system 
 
Source: ZUS (2007 and earlier). 
After 1997, the number of persons below retirement age drawing either pensions or pre-
retirement benefits increased, which is illustrated in Figure 8. This increase stemmed from the 
fact that the reduction in the number of persons receiving early old-age pensions was offset by 
the rise in the number of persons receiving pre-retirement benefits and allowances. The growth 
in the number of persons receiving various types of early retirement transfers was accompanied 
by a drop in the employment rate for persons aged 55-64. This leads to an initial observation 
that routes to early retirement should be reduced for all benefit schemes, as otherwise, the 
substitution effect will appear and the outcomes from a labour market perspective will be 
negligible. In further analysis, the focus is on early retirement pensions from the new pension 
system, as the number of pre-retirement benefits and allowances is declining and eligibility 
criteria (including company restructuring) are further restricting the use of these benefits as a 
route to early retirement in the future.  
Figure 8. Number of persons receiving old-age pensions and pre-retirement benefits below 
retirement age 
 
Source: Calculations by the Department for Economic Analyses and Forecasting, Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy, based on administrative data. 
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Because of the existing options for early retirement, the average age at which the old-age 
pension is taken up is significantly lower than the legal retirement age for both men and women. 
As illustrated in Figure 9, the average retirement age in Poland has not changed substantially 
over the past 16 years. Some of the minor changes that can be observed can be explained by 
minor changes in the legislative framework. At the beginning of the 1990s, the average 
retirement age was around 55 for women and 59 for men. This means that the large inflow of 
new beneficiaries noted at the beginning of the 1990s was mainly owing to the introduction of 
new options for early retirement in 1990. The reduction in the average retirement age before 
1998 is owing to the effect of mass retirement prior to the withdrawal of the early retirement 
possibility in 1998. It reflects the impact of additional inflows into old-age pensions of those 
persons who otherwise would have continued working, but were afraid of losing the right to 
retire after the change in the legislation. The initial decrease was followed by an increase in the 
average retirement age. From 2003, we again observe a reduction in the average effective 
retirement age, which could be related to the withdrawal of the right to early retirement after 
2007, as stipulated by the provisions of the pension system reform of 1999. The drop in recent 
years may be particularly linked to the increased inflow of teachers exercising their right to 
early retirement.   
Figure 9. Average effective retirement age 
 
Source: ZUS (2007 and earlier). 
Apart from the average retirement age, is it also worth analysing the distribution of retirement 
ages and their evolution over time. In 2006, the average retirement age of persons who were 
granted old-age pensions was 56.6 years (57.9 for men and 56.0 for women). Only 26.6% of 
men and 15.1% of women retire at or above the legal retirement age. The majority of both men 
and women retire earlier. Nevertheless, the retirement probability by age differs for men and 
women. In the case of women, the prevailing retirement age is 55. More than 70% of women 
retiring in 2006 did so within the age bracket of 55-59. This tendency is related to the existing 
legal possibility of early retirement at age 55 if total work experience is more than 30 years 
(including periods of university education and childcare leave). In the case of men, the 
retirement probability by age is different. Around a fifth of men who retire do so at age 49 or 
earlier – these are miners and to a lesser extent teachers, who can retire after accumulating the 
required number of years worked in their profession (25 years and 30 years respectively) 
without the age limit.  6 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
Currently, almost half of men retire at ages 60-64. It can be assumed that these are men working 
in special conditions that qualify for early retirement or who are unable to continue working 
because of ill health.  
The distribution of retirement probabilities between 1997 and 2006 can be divided into two 
stages. The first stage, between 1997 and 1999, was a time of change in retirement probabilities 
because of the withdrawal of the opportunity for early retirement due to restructuring. This 
meant that there was a shift in the predominant retirement age from 55-59 to 60-64 in the case 
of men and a reduction in the probability of women retiring under the age of 55. After 1999, the 
new pattern in the retirement age distribution petrified with little change in the probability of 
retirement within a given age bracket (see Figures 10-13). 
Figure 10. Retirement probabilities of men by 
age, 1997–99 (%) 
Figure 11. Retirement probabilities of men by 
age, 2003–06 (%) 
Figure 12. Retirement probabilities of women by 
age, 1997–99 (%) 
Figure 13. Retirement probabilities of women 
by age, 2003–06 (%) 
 
Source: ZUS (2007 and earlier). 
The analysis of retirement probabilities confirms that without changes to the retirement 
incentives or legal rules that restrict the opportunity for earlier retirement, there will be no 
changes in retirement behaviour.  
According to the current legislation, from 2009 early retirement options will no longer be 
available.
3 This system should be replaced by the so-called ‘bridging pensions’, which would be 
                                            
3 In October 2007, the Parliament in Poland adopted a law that extended the possibility of early retirement 
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granted to individuals working in special conditions and with special characteristics based on 
the new list (in theory medically verified). Yet, government work on these pensions has gone on 
for the past eight years, and the system still has yet to be outlined. In the meantime, the existing 
scheme has been preserved for an additional two years compared with the initial reform 
programme. Early retirement is one of the most sensitive political issues in Poland.  
To summarise, the evidence from Poland shows a direct link between the present legal options 
for early retirement and the economic activity of older workers. The existence of numerous 
opportunities to receive long-term benefits (early retirement pensions, disability pensions or pre-
retirement benefits) has an impact on the reduction of economic activity. As a result, a vicious 
circle forms: people exercise their opportunity to receive pensions, leading to a rise in public 
expenditures and increases in the tax wedge, which in turn reduce the demand for labour. 
Reduced demand for labour leads to a fall in the employment of older workers, as they are 
perceived as potentially less productive. This consequence in turn increases the pressure to 
maintain early retirement options in the social system.   
2.  Impact of individual characteristics on retirement behaviour 
The distribution of retirement probabilities presented in the previous section shows that there is 
a variety of retirement behaviours, especially in the case of men, but to a lesser extent also in the 
case of women. In this section, we aim at investigating whether individual characteristics such 
as gender, education, marital status or sector of employment have an impact on retirement 
decisions. We also analyse the distribution of the retirement age with regard to the previous 
earnings level.  
2.1 Transitions  from  employment to retirement 
The results of logit models of transitions between employment and retirement are presented 
below. The models are prepared for two waves of retirement: 2000–01 and 2005–06, with the 
latter being the latest possible, while the former takes into account the period with the highest 
unemployment rate in Poland. The models are based on pseudo-panels constructed from Labour 
Force Survey data. Use of the pseudo-panels allows increases in the number of observations and 
thus makes the model results more robust. This methodology has also caveats, however. 
Namely, we can only analyse the probability of retirement of those who were employed a year 
before. We cannot observe the flows between other states in the labour market (unemployed or 
inactive) and retirement (or more specifically receiving an old-age pension). The models are 
assessed on quarterly data from the fourth quarter of the year analysed.  
2.1.1  Transitions from employment to retirement between 2005 and 2006 
In the model we analyse the group of persons aged 50-69, which is the age category that can be 
defined as ‘at risk of retirement’. 
Table 1 presents a comparison of situations in the labour market in 2005 and 2006. Out of a 
total 8.3 million persons in the analysed age category, almost 3.1 million were already retired, 
while 1.3 million claimed disability. Almost 2.7 million were working. A year later, 177,000 of 
those who worked were inactive, while almost 2.5 million were continuing employment. As 
shown in Table 2, 132,000 of those employed in 2005 were inactive a year later and received a 
pension (for old-age, disability or early retirement). In further analysis, we are interested only in 
those who received a pension, as we focus on the impact of the pension system on decisions to 
become inactive. 8 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
Table 1. Labour market transitions of persons aged 50-69, 2005–06 (in thousands) 
What was your situation a year ago? (2005) 
Status in 
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Employed 2,471 60  0  100 33  2 13  2,679 
Unemployed 37  190  0 14 18  4 20  283 
Inactive  177  199  0 2,956 1,260  197  515 5,304 
Total  2,685  449  0 3,070 1,311  203  548 8,266 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
 
Table 2. Classification of status in 2006 for persons employed in 2005 (in thousands)  
In 2006  LFS category  
Own category   Employment Unemployment  Inactivity  Total 
Employment 2,471  0  0  2,471 
Unemployment or other  0  37  45  82 
Pension 0  0  132  132 
Total 2,471  37  177  2,685 
Notes: The variable ‘own category’ aims at identifying those persons who withdrew from the labour market to 
take up a pension, because not all of those who went from employment to inactivity (214,000 persons) received 
a pension in 2006. Some of them (45,000) became inactive for reasons other than receiving a pension, e.g. they 
resigned because of low earnings and they are currently supported by other family members.  
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
 
The results of the model (Table 3) can be summarised in the following conclusions: 
•  being a woman doubles the probability of retirement (compared with men, other things 
being equal); 
•  compared with employment in industry, being employed in agriculture and fishery 
significantly reduces the likelihood of retirement, as does employment in market services 
(although to a lesser extent), which is partially explained by more restricted access to 
early retirement in the farmers’ pension system; 
•  persons aged 60-64 have a probability of retirement that is five times higher than those 
aged 50-54; and 
•  the lower the education level, the higher is the probability of claiming a pension (77% 
higher in the case of persons with at most primary education compared with those with 
higher education).  
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Table 3. Logit model of flows out of employment, 2005–06 
Number of observations  15,784  
Wald chi2(18)  485.25  
Prob > chi2  0.0000  
Log pseudo likelihood  -4948.5669  
Pseudo R2  0.0551  
Variable (reference group)  retirement RRR 
Flows from employment to unemployment or other than pension inactivity status 
Gender (man)  Woman  1.03 
Fishery and agriculture       0.37*** 
Market services  0.96  Sector of the economy (industry) 
Non-market services      0.59*** 
55-59 1.08 
60-64     0.47***  Age (50-54) 
65-69     0.21*** 
Secondary (and vocational)     2.87*** 
Education (higher) 
Primary and lower     5.29*** 
Flows from employment to retirement 
Gender (man)  Woman  2.11*** 
Fishery and agriculture  0.67*** 
Market services            0.81*  Sector of the economy (industry) 
Non-market services            1.07 
55-59 3.70*** 
60-64 5.12***  Age (50-54) 
65-69 3.98*** 
Secondary (and vocational)  1.58*** 
Education (higher) 
Primary and lower  1.78*** 
*** Significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1  
Notes: The base category is remaining in employment; RRR refers to relative risk ratio. 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
The results of the logit analysis confirm the effects of the existing legal options for receiving a 
pension. These are namely the lower legal retirement age of women, the tendency towards early 
retirement mainly in the industrial sector, a lack of early retirement in the farmers’ pension 
system and a lack of early retirement for the self-employed, who are mainly active in the market 
services sector.   
2.1.2  Transitions from employment to retirement between 2000 and 2001 
Below we present an assessment of a similar logit model for retirement probabilities between 
2000 and 2001 (Table 4).  
 10 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
Table 4 Labour market transitions of persons aged 50-69, 2000–01 (in thousands) 
What was your situation a year ago? (2000) 
Status in 
2001 
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Employed  2,239 32  0 92 49  2  8  2,422 
Unemployed 53  135 0  33  29 4  20  274 
Inactive 224  118  4  2,584  1,360  167  328  4,786 
Total 2,516  285  4  2,709  1,438  173  356  7,482 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
The final database for the calculations covers persons aged 50-69 who were employed in 2000 –
15,839 observations in total corresponding to 2.5 million persons. Almost 2.2 million of these 
continued working in 2001, while 223,000 withdrew from the labour market. Among the latter 
number, 162,000 received a pension (for old age, disability or early retirement) (Table 5). 
Table 5. Classification of status in 2001 for persons employed in 2000 (in thousands) 
In 2001  LFS category  
Own category   Employment Unemployment  Inactivity  Total 
Employment 2,239  0  0  2,239 
Unemployment or other  0  53  61  114 
Pension 0  0  162  162 
Total 2,239  53  223  2,515 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
The estimation of the logit model for transitions to retirement between 2000 and 2001 is 
presented in Table 6. As one can see, the results are quite similar to the 2005–06 estimations, 
which also confirms the administrative data presented in the previous section. In particular, the 
impact of gender on retirement probabilities remained practically unchanged.  
Also in 2000, employment in industry increased the probability of an outflow to pensions 
compared with other sectors in the economy. The impact of this characteristic was higher then 
than in 2005, probably because economic and labour market conditions were worse and 
unemployment levels were higher. Furthermore, the differences in the probabilities of retiring 
among persons with different educational levels had diminished in 2005 compared with 2000.  
Table 6. Logit model of flows out of employment, 2000–01 
Number of observations  15,839  
Wald chi2(18)  762.85  
Prob > chi2  0.0000  
Log pseudo likelihood  -6137.9202  
Pseudo R2  0.0785  
Variable (reference group)  Retirement RRR RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR IN POLAND | 11 
Table 7. cont’d 
Flows from employment to unemployment or other than pension inactivity status 
Gender (man)  Woman 0.97 
Fishery and agriculture  0.14*** 
Market services  0.8**  Sector of the economy (industry) 
Non-market services  0.43*** 
55-59 0.96 
60-64 0.48***  Age (50-54) 
65-69 0.17*** 
Secondary (and vocational)  2.51***  Education (higher) 
Primary and lower  4.22*** 
Flows from employment to retirement 
Gender (man)  Woman 2.08*** 
Fishery and agriculture  0.27*** 
Market services  0.61***  Sector of the economy (industry) 
Non-market services  0.89 
55-59 3.26*** 
60-64 5.2***  Age (50-54) 
65-69 4.14*** 
Secondary (and vocational)  1.62***  Education (higher) 
Primary and lower  2.21*** 
*** Significant at 0.01; ** significant at 0.05; * significant at 0.1  
Notes: The base category is remaining in employment; RRR refers to relative risk ratio. 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data. 
2.1.3  Retirement age and wage level 
The labour Force Survey data used for the estimation in the previous sections do not allow an 
investigation of whether the individual wage level has an impact on retirement decisions. Based 
on the results presented in the previous section, we can set a hypothesis that a higher education 
level, linked to higher qualifications and skills leads to a higher wage level, which in turn leads 
to later retirement. Research on the deactivation of individuals around retirement age (MPiPS, 
2008) shows that a higher wage level leads to the postponement of retirement. 
Analysis of the data on newly granted pensions in relation to the assessment base
4 enables us to 
test this hypothesis in the case of persons retiring in 2006 (see Table 8). 
The data presented shows that in the case of men, the relationship between the age of retirement 
and wage level does not fully follow the hypothesis, which is illustrated in Figure 14. As one 
can see, the largest share of men retiring earliest (at age 49 and younger and the age group 50-
54) retires with the highest assessment base; this group is mainly made up of miners, who can 
retire at such low ages.  
The third age group that has a relatively high share of retirees with the highest wage level are 
men aged 65 and older. This may indicate that men with higher wages working in professions 
with no early retirement privileges retire relatively late, which is consistent with the formed 
hypothesis. 
                                            
4 The assessment base is the average individual wage level compared with the national average taken for 
10 consecutive years, selected from the past 20 years of earnings.  12 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
 
Table 8. Persons who were granted an old-age pension from the social insurance fund by age and assessment base level 
Age  Assessment base (% of average wage) 
  Total  25 and 
less  25–38 38-51 50–63 63–75 75–88  88–101 101–113  113–126 126–139 139–151 151–164 164–177 177–189 189–
202 
202 and 
more 
   Total 
Total  103,853 2,497 1,662 3,465 9,055 11,073 11,022 11,040 10,459 8,671 6,663 4,928 3,839 3,265 2,995 2,688 10,531 
49 and less  7,424 0 4 9 34 137 364 380 384  298 200 155 260 515 788 929 2,967 
50-54  9,952 6 5  23 62 248 767 1,139 1,545  1,516 1,054 650 441 428 384 355 1,329 
55-59  54,153 350 593  2,026 6,658 8,467 7,270 6,474 5,414 4,121 3,153 2,334 1,736 1,280 960 699 2,618 
60-64  22,647 1,605 835  1,063 1,734 1,606 1,899 2,286 2,357 2,064 1,670 1,269 959 675 522 437 1,666 
65 and 
more  9,677 536 225 344 567 615 722 761 759 672 586 520 443 367 341 268 1,951 
   Men 
Total  33,627 554 281 489 801 1,203 1,966 2,753 3,033 2,772 2,374 2,080 1,859 1,958 2,032 1,969 7,503 
49 and less  5,758 0 0 2 8 18 41 49 59  55 52 94 221 494 778 926 2,961 
50-54  3,702 1 1  11 21 24 50 125 201  245 231 244 232 348 332 338 1,298 
55-59  2,490 3 5  21 29 35 50 123 179  218 258 305 268 270 235 141 350 
60-64  12,716 93 81  134 230 552 1,151 1,736 1,872  1,622 1,301 941 732 504 371 314 1,082 
65 and 
more  8,961 457 194 321 513 574 674 720 722 632 532 496 406 342 316 250 1,812 
   Women 
Total  70,226 1,943 1,381 2,976 8,254 9,870 9,056 8,287 7,426 5,899 4,289 2,848 1,980 1,307 963 719 3,028 
49 and less  1,666 0 4 7 26 119 323 331 325  243 148 61 39 21 10 36  
50-54  6,250 5 4  12 41 224 717 1,014 1,344  1,271 823 406 209 80 52 17 31 
55-59  51,663 347 588  2,005 6,629 8,432 7,220 6,351 5,235 3,903 2,895 2,029 1,468 1,010 725 558 2,268 
60-64  9,931 1,512 754 929 1,504 1,054 748 550 485 442 369 328 227 171 151 123 584 
65 and 
more  716 79 31 23 54 41 48 41 37 40 54 24 37 25 25 18 139 
Source: ZUS.  
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Figure 14. Inflows to retirement by age group and wage level in 2006, men 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ZUS data. 
An analysis of retirement inflows by wage level for women shows a different picture (Figure 
15). Here we can see that the cohort of women retiring at age 65 and older has the largest 
proportion of women with the highest assessment base. Yet, for other age groups the prevailing 
assessment base tends to decrease with age, and it is higher for women retiring at ages younger 
than 54 than it is for those retiring at ages 55-59 and 60-64. The lower assessment base in the 
latter group may also be related to the fact that self-employed women cannot retire at age 55, 
but at age 60, when their assessment base is 60% of the average wage (which is the minimum 
base for social security contribution payments for the self-employed).  
Figure 15. Inflows to retirement by age group and wage level in 2006, women 
 
Source: Own calculations based on ZUS data. 14 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
3.  Potential impact of changes in the pension system on retirement 
behaviour 
The reform of the old-age pension system introduced in 1999 is designed to break the vicious 
circle described above. The reform includes first, the abolition of any early retirement options 
under the old-age pension system. Those covered by the new system will not be able to retire 
prior to the legal retirement age, set at age 60 years for women and 65 for men. This rule, fully 
implemented, will lead to a rapid increase in retirement ages, which should be apparent from 
2009, when cohorts covered by the new system retire.
5  
Additionally, the new system also has mechanisms that encourage the prolonging of working 
lives. The new pension system is based on the defined contribution principle and financed from 
two accounts: a notional (pay-as-you-go) and funded contribution (NDC and FDC, 
respectively). In both parts of the mandatory system, the pension level depends on two main 
factors – the value of the individual account and life expectancy at retirement age.  
Contributions paid to the old age system (a total of 19.52% of the gross wage) are split between 
the NDC (12.22% of wage) and the FDC accounts (7.3% of wage). They earn a rate of interest, 
which in the case of the NDC equals the growth of the wage bill covered by social security and 
in the case of the FDC equals the returns on investment of a given open pension fund. This 
approach means that each contribution paid to the pension system, even at very early ages will 
count towards the future pension value.  
In a simplified way, we can denote the pension formula as follows: 
 
As shown in Figure 16, the accumulation of pension savings increases at the end of the working 
career, when the base for potential returns is highest. Furthermore, as retirement is postponed, 
life expectancy also decreases. Thus, the incentives to prolong working lives are quite strong.  
Figure 16. Accumulation of pension capital 
  
Notes: A person starts working at age 20 and continues to work until retirement age without any breaks. Wage 
growth is 3% (and the NDC return is equal to wage growth); the return on the funded part of the pension 
system is an average of 4.9% in the projection period. 
Source: Own calculations. 
                                            
5 It should be noted that the initial assumptions of the pension reform were diluted by the extension of the 
transition rules for early retirement by an extra year, as well as the re-introduction of special early 
retirement pensions for miners. This change happened in 2005, preceding the parliamentary elections as a 
response to the demonstration of miners in front of the Parliament.  RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR IN POLAND | 15 
Figure 17 shows a comparison of changes in pension levels for different retirement ages. It 
shows the change in the nominal pension value resulting from an additional year of work for 
persons with different wage levels. There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this 
simulation.  
Figure 17. Simulation of changes in pension levels depending on retirement age and wage level 
in the old and new systems 
 
Notes: AW refers to average wage; a person starts working at age 20 and continues to work until retirement age 
without any breaks. Wage growth is 3% (and the NDC return is equal to wage growth); the return on the 
funded part of the pension system is an average of 4.9% in the projection period. 
Source: Own calculations. 
First, there is a significant difference between the old and new systems. In the new system, the 
reward for postponing retirement is significantly higher. A pension value increases by some 
10% per year. Under the old system, pension increases were much lower – less than 5% per 
year. In other words, the accrual rate increases from 1.3% to a variable rate, ranging from 
around 3% for someone retiring at age 60 to more than 6% for someone retiring at age 70 
(Figure 18). Piekkola (2008) shows that increases of the actuarial adjustment to around 7 
percentage points per year would lead to an increase in the retirement age by around 4.4 years in 
selected EU countries (even up to 6 years in Belgium or Germany). It should be noted that 
owing to the withdrawal of early retirement options in the new Polish system, the effective 
retirement age should increase by around 5 years, which shows that the change in the legal 
options roughly corresponds to the potential change in retirement behaviour from alterations to 
the pension calculation method.  
Second, with the rise in the retirement age, the rate at which the pension increases is higher in 
the new system, while in the old system the link between the retirement age and the pension 
increase rate was weaker.  
Third, the new system offers the same incentives to prolong working life for all wage levels. 
Under the old system, the pension value increase was lower for those with lower earnings, 
which provided an additional disincentive for workers with lower earnings to continue their 
activity beyond the earliest retirement age. This aspect is related to changes in the distributional 
effects in the pension system. The old system formula included a large flat-rate component, 
equal to 24% of the average wage. Consequently, workers who earned less than the average 
wage could expect higher replacement rates compared with those whose earnings were above 
average. Thus, the old system aimed at redistribution from higher to lower income earners. 16 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
The new pension system does not include such distributional components. The pension level is 
based solely on individual contributions and redistribution is included in two ways: 
•  for selected periods (maternity, childcare leave, unemployment or mandatory army 
service), pension contributions are paid from public funds; and 
•  the minimum pension guarantee, financed from the state budget, tops up the individual 
pension. 
Figure 18. Simulation of accrual rates in the new pension system 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
As a result, the distribution of pensions will follow the distribution of wages more closely than 
in the past. Nevertheless, as previously shown in Figure 17, the rate at which the pension 
increases will be higher for the low-income earners. This means that the new system provides 
more incentives for this group to postpone retirement.  
Another feature of the new pension system that is important from the perspective of ageing and 
retirement decisions is the impact of changes in life expectancy on retirement. The pension 
formula applied in Poland automatically adjusts to increases in life expectancy, as each year the 
denominator in the pension formula is increased, following a change in the reported life 
expectancy. This means that a cohort retiring a year later can expect a little lower pension value 
for the same amount of capital or, in other words, that they would have to work a couple of 
months longer to expect the same pension level as a cohort retiring a year before. The potential 
impact of this feature of the pension system is illustrated in Figure 19. As one can see, increases 
in life expectancy between 1995 and 2005 would cause a drop of around 10% of the total 
pension value for the same amount of pension savings.  
The new system provides strong incentives to prolong working life. Additionally, it limits 
options for early retirement. Hence, in the course of the next few years we can expect another 
transition of retirement patterns leading to a rise in the average retirement age and growth in the 
labour market participation of older workers. These outcomes of course depend on several 
assumptions. The first assumption is that the initial reform scenario will not be further amended, 
allowing an additional extension of the current low retirement age. The second assumption is 
that people will react to incentives. A systematic public education effort by the public 
authorities is required to improve the ‘pension literacy’ of the Polish population. One element of 
such an education effort is the annual information on individual accounts that is sent by the 
social insurance institution to the covered workers. From 2008, this information will also cover 
the calculation of the accrued pension based on the current account value and the projected 
account value for selected potential ages of retirement.  RETIREMENT BEHAVIOUR IN POLAND | 17 
Figure 19. Changes in potential pension values owing to increases in life expectancy in Poland, 
1995–2005 
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Source: Own calculations based on GUS data. 
The challenge still ahead is the effort to equalise the retirement ages of men and women. Poland 
is one of the very few countries in the EU that has kept differentiated minimum retirement ages 
for men and women. Despite several attempts by the government, during the preparation of the 
new pension system as well as afterwards, there was neither a political nor a social consensus to 
change this aspect.  
Conclusions 
Poland ranks among those countries that have the lowest labour market participation of older 
workers and the lowest effective retirement age in the EU. This is a legacy of past policies, 
mainly aimed at reducing the pressures of the economic transition on the labour market.  
Such a policy has a high price, however, which is still being paid today. Namely, the high tax 
wedge and the practice of ‘pushing out’ those aged 50 and older from the labour market through 
various benefit schemes are the main causes of the very low employment rate in Poland. After 
EU accession and rapid changes in the labour market – which transformed from a ‘shortage of 
jobs’ to a ‘shortage of skills’ – a potential source of labour supply is lost owing to a deactivation 
of workers that occurs to early.  
The low employment rate and low retirement ages of Polish workers are among the most 
important challenges to labour market policy in Poland. The old defined-benefit pension system 
encouraged early retirement and withdrawal from the labour market. It had strong disincentives 
to postpone retirement. The new pension system that will be fully implemented in a few years’ 
time can support the extension of working lives in Poland. It can do so through a significant 
reduction of early retirement options and the greater incentives offered by increased accrual 
rates. But it is only when the new pensions are paid that we will be able to assess whether 
people react to the incentives.   18 | CHLON-DOMINCZAK 
Pension reform also entails changes in distributional effects. As the new pension system is 
linked solely to individual wages, lower income earners can actually expect higher increases in 
accrual rates with additional years of working than those with higher wages. This feature 
provides an added incentive for those with lower earnings to prolong their working lives.   
Still, the pension system alone is not sufficient. Continuous efforts are needed to encourage 
workers in Poland to stay in the labour market longer than they do currently. This goal requires 
a set of well-designed labour market policies and a changing legal framework to support the 
increase in the labour market participation of older workers.  
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